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Articles
CONSTRUCTIVETRUSTS AND
IMPROVEMENTS TO PROPERTY
MARK PAWLOWSKI, Barrister, Professor of Property Law, University
of Greenwich
The principles under which a non-owning
cohabitee may acquire a beneficial interest
in property which is in the sole legal
ownership of his/her partner are
well-rehearsed in the landmark cases of
Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset and Another [1991]
1 AC 107, HL, [1990] 2 FLR 155 and Oxley v
Hiscock [2004] 2 FLR 669, CA. The twofold
requirements of common intention (express
or inferred) coupled with detrimental
reliance, necessary to support a
constructive trust, are now firmly rooted in
our law of property. The recent House of
Lords’ ruling in Stack v Dowden [2007]
UKHL 17, [2007] 1 FLR 1858 has also
sought to clarify the relevant principles to
be applied in assessing beneficial
entitlement in the context of a family home
which has been purchased in the joint
names of the parties where one joint owner
is seeking to establish that he (or she) owns
more than a joint beneficial interest.
Although much of the recent case law
has focused on the issue of assessment of
the parties’ beneficial ownership, there is
still remarkably little guidance on what
detriment is required to support a
constructive trust at the initial (or
threshold) stage of the court’s inquiry into
the claimant’s claim. This is particularly so
when it comes to improvements carried out
to the property by either or both of the
parties subsequent to acquisition.
SINGLE OWNERSHIP
Express common intention
It is evident that, in the express common
intention category, very little detriment is
required and a wide range of conduct may
qualify to support a constructive trust:
Stokes v Anderson [1991] 1 FLR 391, at p 400,
CA. In Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638, at
p 657, CA, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson
V-C opined that:
‘ . . . once it has been shown that there
was a common intention that the
claimant should have an interest in the
house, any act done by her to her
detriment relating to the joint lives of
the parties is, in my judgment,
sufficient to qualify. The acts do not
have to be inherently referable to the
house.’
This liberal approach to the meaning of
detriment in the specific context of an
express common constructive trust is
echoed in Rosset where Lord Bridge
referred to the required detriment in this
category as being merely a ‘significant
alteration in position’ by the claimant: ibid,
at p 132. In Grant, however, Nourse LJ
(taking a stricter approach than that taken
by Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson)
concluded that the detrimental conduct
must be such upon which the non-owning
partner could not reasonably have been
expected to embark unless he (or she) was
to have an interest in the house: ibid, at
p 648. On either formula, however, it is
submitted that expenditure on
improvements or undertaking physical
labour may count towards establishing a
constructive trust in this category. In Eves v
Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338, CA, for example,
the female partner had done considerable
work, some of it very heavy, to the house
and garden and was held to have entitled
her to a quarter beneficial share despite the
absence of any financial contribution by her
to the initial purchase price of the property:
see also, Briggs v Rowan [1991] EGCS 6,
where the common intention was that the
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deceased would occupy a cottage for the
remainder of her life and who had
advanced just under £30,000 to enable the
legal owner to construct an extension for
this purpose.
The post-Rosset case of Drake v Whipp
[1996] 1 FLR 826, CA is in the same
category. In this case, there was a common
understanding between the parties that
they were both to share beneficially despite
the property (a barn) being purchased in
the sole name of the male partner. The
female claimant had contributed to the
initial purchase price and also to the later
conversion works. Both parties also
contributed to the conversion by way of
direct labour. Having overcome the initial
hurdle of establishing a common intention
by evidence of express discussions, the
claimant was awarded a one third share in
the property based on the court’s broader
approach to quantification which looked at
the parties’ entire course of conduct
together. This meant taking into account
not only direct contributions to the
acquisition and conversion costs but also
their respective contributions to labour.
A more recent example of the court
taking into account a broad range of factors
(including improvement works) is to be
found in Cox v Jones [2004] EWHC 1486,
[2004] 2 FLR 1010 where Mann J, applying
Oxley above, held that the female claimant
was entitled to a quarter share of the
beneficial ownership. In this case, as in
Drake, above, the parties had had an
express common intention to share the
property, but there was no express
agreement as to the claimant’s actual share.
Inferred common intention
In the absence of any finding of an
agreement or arrangement between the
parties to share beneficially, the court may
alternatively rely on the parties’ conduct
both as a basis from which to infer a
common intention and as the detrimental
conduct relied on to give rise to a
constructive trust. The relevant conduct,
therefore, serves a dual purpose when
determining whether the claimant has
surmounted the first hurdle of establishing
a constructive trust under Lord Bridge’s
scheme in Rosset.
In this situation, the court has to look
for ‘expenditure which is referable to the
acquisition of the house’: Grant, above, at
p 647, per Nourse LJ. It is insufficient,
therefore, for the claimant to contribute
merely towards household expenses
simpliciter, purchase chattels for the house,
or to do the housework, decorating or
gardening, since such conduct does not
manifest an intention of assisting the
purchase of the house and, therefore, with
the aim of acquiring some interest in the
property. This stance has been reaffirmed
most recently in Stack, above, where the
House of Lords made clear that mere
payments towards household bills and
outgoings, or merely living together for a
long time, having children, or operating a
joint bank account would not by
themselves support an intention to alter
beneficial entitlement where the parties had
purchased the property in joint names.
Such matters are only relevant as ‘part of
the vital background’ in the sense of
providing the context by reference to which
any discussions or actions, subsequent to
purchase, fell to be assessed by the court.
Do, however, improvements to the
property qualify so as to establish the first
hurdle under Rosset?
(a) Financial contributions and improvements
The decision in Davis v Vale [1971] 2 All ER
1021, CA, is illustrative of a case where the
court inferred the requisite common
intention to share beneficially based on the
parties’ financial contributions towards
acquisition and subsequent improvements
to the property. Here, the house was
conveyed into the husband’s sole name, but
the wife had made an initial (direct)
financial contribution to the purchase price
(out of the parties’ joint account which was
fed by their joint savings) and a sum of
£234 out of her own money for
improvements to the house. The husband
had paid all the mortgage instalments and
did the work of fitting and fixing the
improvements. Although the case was
decided primarily by the application of s 37
of the Matrimonial Proceedings and
Property Act 1970 which applies to married
(and engaged) couples, the Court of Appeal
emphasised that the provision was merely
declaratory of the common law. Apart,
therefore, from s 37, in the absence of any
express agreement or understanding
between the parties to share the house
beneficially, the court inferred a trust
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(based on the parties’ contributions to the
purchase price and subsequent
improvements) whereby the beneficial
interest in the property was to be shared
equally. Significantly, Lord Denning
referred to the parties’ initial contributions
to purchase as raising ‘the proper
inference . . . that, although the house was
taken in the husband’s name, the wife had
a share in it’: ibid, at 1026. The case,
therefore, can be explained on post-Rosset
principles (see, in particular, Midland Bank
plc v Cooke [1995] 3 All ER 562, CA, [1995]
2 FLR 915 and Oxley v Hiscock [2004] 2 FLR
669, CA) that, in the absence of express
agreement, once there is some basis on
which a beneficial interest of some size can
be justified (by reference, in Davis, to the
wife’s initial direct contribution to the
purchase price), this allows a wider range
of factors to be taken into account in
determining the quantification of the
interest including (as in Davis) substantial
improvements to the property. The decision
in Davis, therefore, it is submitted, is in line
with modern authority which permits the
court, once a claimant’s interest is
established by means of a financial
contribution to the purchase price of the
property, to undertake ‘a survey the whole
course of dealing between the parties’
relevant to their ownership and occupation
of the house in assessing beneficial
entitlement: Oxley, above, at para [69], per
Chadwick LJ. Once the initial Rosset hurdle
of establishing a common intention is
overcome, the court is no longer confined
to the limited range of acts of financial
contribution needed to support the
constructive trust in the first place – it is
now free to take into account all conduct
(including, it is submitted later
improvements to the property) which
throw light on the question what shares
were intended at the time of acquisition.
The decision in Cooke v Head [1972]
1 WLR 518, CA, can also be explained on
this reasoning. Here, the parties, an
unmarried couple, planned to build a
bungalow in which they could live after the
defendant’s wife had divorced him and
they were able to get married. A plot was
purchased by the defendant with the aid of
a deposit (paid by him) and a mortgage.
The claimant’s part of the building work
involved demolishing some old buildings,
removing hardcore and rubble, working the
cement mixer and painting. The work was
characterised as being ‘quite an unusual
amount of work for a woman’: ibid, at 519,
per Lord Denning MR. Significantly, the
claimant also helped with the mortgage
instalments so, again, under the Rosset
scheme, this would have entitled the court
to infer a common intention on the basis of
direct financial contributions. Although the
actual decision proceeded on a different
basis enunciated by Lord Denning, his
Lordship, having found the requisite
common intention to share beneficially, was
then able to look at the matter ‘more
broadly’ to see what the claimant’s equity
was worth at the time the parties
separated. In assessing the parties’ shares,
therefore, he was able to consider a wide
range of factors, including:
‘ . . . the statements made to third
parties; the method in which they
saved, the method of paying the
mortgage instalments; the amount of
the direct cash contributions of each;
the amount of the work each had done
on the property; the part each had
taken in the planning and the design of
the house; and the steps by which the
transactions were carried out’.
Taking all those matters into account, the
claimant’s share in the property was held
to be one third of the net proceeds of sale:
see also, Re Nicholson (deceased); Nicholson v
Perks [1974] 1 WLR 476, where the wife had
made an initial financial contribution
towards the purchase price and later
mortgage instalments together with various
payments for the installation of a central
heating system – the latter was held to give
the wife an enlarged share in her beneficial
interest.
(b) Improvements alone
There is also case law which suggests that a
subsequent improvement by one of the
parties may qualify on its own to create a
beneficial share even in the absence of any
financial contributions to the initial
purchase or subsequent mortgage
instalments. In Bernard v Josephs [1982] 1 Ch
391, CA, Griffiths LJ said (at p 404):
‘It might in exceptional circumstances
be inferred that the parties agreed to
alter their beneficial interests after the
house was bought; an example would
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be if the man bought the house in the
first place and the woman years later
used a legacy to build an extra floor to
make more room for the children. In
such circumstances, the obvious
inference would be that the parties
agreed that the woman should acquire
a share in the greatly increased value of
the house produced by her money’.
The point is also addressed by Fox LJ in
Burns v Burns [1984] FLR 216, CA:
‘ . . . while, initially, there was no
intention that the claimant should have
any interest in the property,
circumstances may subsequently arise
from which the intention to confer an
equitable interest upon the claimant
may arise (e.g. the discharge of a
mortgage or the effecting of capital
improvements to the house at his or
her expense)‘.
In Passee v Passee [1988] 1 FLR 263, CA, for
example, the claimant’s share was
increased to take into account his
expenditure on subsequent capital
improvements to the property. There are
also suggestions in Pettit v Pettit [1970] AC
777, HL, that later improvements to the
property will give rise to an inferred
common intention provided they are
substantial in nature. Thus, in Lord Reid’s
view (at 796):
‘If a spouse provides, with the assent of
the spouse who owns the house,
improvements of a capital or
non-recurring nature, I do not think
that it is necessary to prove an
agreement before that spouse can
acquire any right.’
Unfortunately, a different conclusion was
reached by Lord Hodson, who found
himself unable to agree with Lord Reid’s
observation notwithstanding the latter’s
open acknowledgment that there is a fine
distinction between financial contributions
to purchase and improvements
subsequently made to the property which
increase its value: ibid, at p 811. In Pettit
itself, the husband’s claim failed largely
because the improvements comprised
merely redecoration to the house and,
therefore, was characterised as having been
done for the benefit of the family without
altering the wife’s title or interest in the
property which had been registered in her
sole name. In the words of Lord Diplock (at
p 826):
‘It is common enough nowadays for
husbands and wives to decorate and to
make improvements in the family
home themselves, with no other
intention than to indulge in what is
now a popular hobby, and to make the
home pleasanter for their common use
and enjoyment. If the husband likes to
occupy his leisure by laying a new
lawn in the garden or building a fitted
wardrobe in the bathroom while the
wife does the shopping, cooks the
family dinner or bathes the children, I,
for my part, find it quite impossible to
impute to them as reasonable husband
and wife any common intention that
these domestic activities or any of them
are to have any effect upon the existing
proprietary rights in the family home
on which they are undertaken.’
The earlier case of Button v Button [1968]
1 WLR 457, CA, is also illustrative. The
house had been purchased in the husband’s
name with no discussions about beneficial
ownership. The wife had worked hard in
decorating and improving their former
home (a cottage) which was later sold and
the proceeds used to fund the purchase of
the house together with the help of a
mortgage. The Court of Appeal refused to
award any interest to the wife based on her
work to the cottage. Lord Denning
summarised the position in these terms (at
p 462):
‘This is the first case, I think, to come
about before us where the wife has
done work on the husband’s house but
has made no financial contribution . . .
The wife does not get a share in the
house simply because she cleans the
walls or works in the garden or helps
her husband with the painting and
decorating. Those are the sort of things
which a wife does for the benefit of the
family without altering the title to, or
interests in, the property.’
In Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, HL, the
wife’s improvements to the house
comprised the purchase of some
furnishings and the laying of a lawn.
Again, the claim failed. Similarly, the work
done in Appleton v Appleton [1965] 1 WLR
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25 was characterised in Pettit as ‘not going
beyond what a reasonable husband might
be expected to do’: ibid, at p 806, per Lord
Morris. Indeed, Appleton was overruled in
Pettit on this ground. In Thomas v
Fuller-Brown [1988] 1 FLR 237, CA, the male
partner’s claim also failed, despite
significant works of improvement to the
house, because there was no evidence from
which to infer a common intention that he
should have a beneficial interest in the
property. On the contrary, the female owner
had made no offer of an interest in the
property and the work had been carried
out in return for meals, lodgings on site,
pocket-money and cohabitation.
By contrast, in Jansen v Jansen [1965]
3 WLR 875, CA, approved in Pettit by Reid
and Diplock LJJ, the relevant works of
conversion carried out by the husband
were held to have significantly enhanced
the value of the house (which had been
bought by the wife alone). Lord Denning,
who viewed the case as being akin to a
joint partnership, said (at p 882):
‘The wife supplied the capital in the
shape of the house. The husband
supplied the labour. By means of their
joint efforts a profit was made. If these
two were not husband and wife, the
law would readily infer a provision
that he should have some part of the
profit. So should equity say today,
seeing that the marriage has broken
up.’
Interestingly, in Ungurian v Lesnoff [1990]
Ch 206, [1990] 2 FLR 299, a case involving a
house registered in the male partner’s sole
name, the female claimant’s works of
improvement (involving the installation of
central heating, rewiring and replumbing)
were held to give rise to an inferred
intention that she would have the right to
reside in the house for life. In this case, as
in Jansen, above, the claimant had not
provided any financial contribution
towards the initial cost of acquisition.
A more striking example, perhaps, of a
successful claim to a beneficial interest
based on improvements alone is to be
found in the well-known case of Hussey v
Palmer [1972] 1 WLR 1286, CA, where a
mother-in-law was awarded a beneficial
interest in her son-in-law’s house
proportionate to the £607 which she had
paid to build an extension onto the
property which it was intended she would
occupy as a home for the rest of her life. In
the words of Lord Denning MR (at p 1290):
‘Just as a person, who pays part of the
purchase price, acquires an equitable
interest in the house, so also he does
when he pays for an extension to be
added to it.’
The obvious conclusion here is that mere
improvements to property may rank as an
equivalent financial contribution to the cost
of acquisition and, therefore, be capable of
supporting an inferred common intention
constructive trust. (Contrast, however,
Spence v Brown (1988) 18 Fam Law 291, CA,
where the mother-in-law’s payment to her
daughter and son-in-law for various home
improvements were clearly considered as
loans and not as supporting a constructive
trust).
JOINT OWNERSHIP
This recognition of improvements in single
ownership cases is also, it is submitted,
consistent with the House of Lords’
approach to subsequent improvements in
Stack involving, as indicated earlier, a
house purchase where the legal title was
conveyed into joint names. Indeed, on a
liberal reading of the speeches on this
point, there is considerable scope for
arguing (in line with earlier case law
referred to above) that improvements to
property rank not only as factors in
assessing the quantum of the parties’
beneficial interests but as financial
contributions referable to the initial (or
threshold) question as to whether there is
the requisite detriment to support a
constructive trust in the first place. Lord
Hope opined that ‘indirect contributions,
such as making improvements which
added significant value to the property . . .
ought to be taken into account as well as
financial contributions made directly
towards the purchase of the property’: ibid,
at para [12]. It is not entirely clear, however,
whether his Lordship was addressing these
remarks to the issue of quantification or,
more significantly, to the initial hurdle of
establishing a common intention within the
Rosset scheme. Lord Walker is equally
ambiguous, although he does make specific
reference to Lord Bridge’s speech in Rosset
stating that ‘the law has [since] moved on’:
684 August [2009] Fam Law
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ibid, at para [26]. His reference, however, to
‘contributions in kind in the form of
manual labour or improvements’ (at para
[36]) was made in the specific context of the
factors relevant to the question of the
quantification of the parties’ respective
beneficial shares and not with reference to
Lord Bridge’s second category of
constructive trust in Rosset. Baroness Hale,
after recognising that ‘we are not in this
case concerned with the first hurdle’,
acknowledges that ‘there is undoubtedly an
argument for saying . . . that the
observations, which were strictly obiter
dicta, of Lord Bridge . . . have set the hurdle
rather too high in certain respects’: ibid, at
para [63]. In her view, however, the point
did not arise for consideration because a
conveyance into joint names was sufficient
in the majority of cases to surmount the
first hurdle.
Lord Neuberger, on the other hand,
although recognising that it may be
difficult in the abstract to identify the
factors which can be taken into account to
infer a common intention under the first
hurdle, specifically refers to events
occurring after the acquisition of the house
which may alter the beneficial interests
under the trust arising initially at the date
of acquisition. In this connection, a
significant improvement to the home (the
cost being seen as a capital expenditure)
would, in his Lordship’s view, justify an
adjustment of the parties’ beneficial shares.
To qualify, however, the work would need
to be substantial so that decoration or
minor repairs would not suffice for this
purpose. Baroness Hale gives the example
of a party financing (or constructing) an
extension to the property so that what the
parties have now is significantly different
from what they had taken originally at the
time of acquisition: ibid, at para [70].
QUANTIFICATION OF
IMPROVEMENTS
It is not easy to discern from the authorities
what approach should be taken in
assessing the amount of the claimant’s
share in the beneficial interest attributable
to significant improvements. In Griffiths v
Griffiths [1973] 1 WLR 1454, Arnold J took a
pragmatic approach concluding that it
would not be just simply to award the cost
of an improvement which had added
nothing to the value of the house when it
came to be realised – conversely, it would
be wrong that the claimant should be
denied more than the cost of an
improvement which had contributed
greatly to the overall worth of the property
and, in some cases, even beyond its
ultimate sale price. Looking, therefore, at
the position in the round, his Lordship was
content to see what had been achieved by
the improvement in the realisation of the
property or (if no sale was contemplated)
its current value.
A similar ‘added-value’ approach was
adopted in Re Nicholson (deceased); Nicholson
v Perks [1974] 1 WLR 476, where
Pennycuick VC held that the proper way in
which to work out the improvements
(falling within s 37 of the Matrimonial
Proceedings and Property Act 1970) was to
ascertain the value of the property at the
date immediately before the making of the
improvement and then to identify what
addition to the value of the property was
due to the improvement. The share of the
party who made the improvement should
then be treated as enlarged by a
proportionate amount corresponding to the
increase in value represented by the
improvement. Thus (at p 483):
‘If the property before the improvement
is worth £6,000 and the parties are
entitled to it in equal shares, that is to
say, £3,000 each, and if the
improvement increases the value of the
property by £1,000 then the respective
shares instead of being three-sixths and
three-sixths will become four-sevenths
and three-sevenths.’
The difficulty, however, as observed by
Millett J in Re Pavlou [1993] 2 FLR 751, at
p 753 is that ‘most expenditure on property
results in a much smaller increase in value
than the amount expended’ or is simply
not reflected in any increase in value at all.
In Pavlou itself, his Lordship resolved the
difficulty by ordering that the wife would
be entitled to credit only for half of the
lesser of the actual expenditure and any
increase in the value realised thereby. The
question, therefore, whether to award the
cost of the improvement or the
added-value to the property will depend
very much on the facts of each individual
case.
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CONCLUSION
The following principles, it is submitted,
emerge from the case law:
(1) Where there is evidence of an express
agreement, arrangement or
understanding between the parties, a
significant contribution in the form of
physical labour towards improvements
to the property will give rise to a
beneficial interest: Eves v Eves and
Briggs v Rowan. Where the parties have
contributed both towards the cost of
the improvements and provided
physical labour, this will also merit a
beneficial share in the property: Drake v
Whipp.
(2) In the absence of any express
agreement, arrangement or
understanding, the court may infer a
common intention to share beneficially
based on the parties’ financial
contributions towards acquisition and
subsequent improvements to the
property: Davis v Vale; Re Nicholson
(deceased); Nicholson v Perks; Cooke v
Head and Passee v Passee. Subsequent
improvements on their own may also
qualify even in the absence of any
financial contribution to the purchase
price: Stack v Dowden, per Lord
Neuberger of Abbotsbury and Baroness
Hale of Richmond; Bernard v Josephs,
per Griffiths LJ; Pettit v Pettit, per Lord
Reid.
(3) In order to qualify, the improvements
must be significant in nature so that
mere decoration, minor repairs,
gardening, DIY jobs, etc will not suffice:
Pettit v Pettit, per Lord Diplock;
Appleton v Appleton; Button v Button;
Jansen v Jansen; Ungurian v Lesnoff and
Hussey v Palmer.
(4) If the improvements are carried out or
paid for by way of loan or in return for
cohabitation or other motive, they will
not qualify: Spence v Brown and Thomas
v Fuller-Brown.
(5) The improvements will normally be
quantified by taking an added-value
approach: Griffiths v Griffiths; Re
Nicholson (deceased); Nicholson v Perks
and Re Pavlou.
(6) Where the parties are married or
engaged to be married, s 37 of the
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property
Act 1970 (as amended by s 2(1) of the
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 2004) allows the court to take into
account substantial improvements to
property as giving rise to a share (or
enlarged share) in the beneficial interest
without any express of inferred
common intention: Samuels (WA)‘s
Trustee v Samuels (1973) 233 EG 145;
Kowalczuk v Kowalczuk [1973] 2 All ER
1042, CA; Griffiths v Griffiths and Re
Nicholson (deceased); Nicholson v Perks.
An identical provision applies to civil
partners: s 65 of the Civil Partnership
Act 2004.
686 August [2009] Fam Law
A
rticle
s
Letterpart Ltd – Typeset in XML ❄ Division: FLJ_2009_08_Articles_02 ❄ Sequential 7
Trim Size = 246mm x 185mm
